Takoma Park Workshop I

[edit] Closing the Polls

1. After the polls close, all Judges should be present to oversee the closing election procedures, signing the Closing Certificate and Ballot Security Certificate.
2. The Chief Judge and Ward Judges will oversee the sealing of the Ballot Boxes.
3. The Ward Judges and Chief Judge will initial the seal.
4. Ward Judges should escort their ballot boxes and the scanner to storage when instructed by the Chief Judge.
5. Ballot Judges should perform a count of the Voter Authority Cards and record the information on the Closing Certificate.
6. The Audit Judges perform a count of the audited ballots and enter them onto the Closing Certificate. The Audit Judges will also include a complete list of audited ballot serial numbers.
7. Scanner Judges will record the daylong scanned ballot count to the Closing Certificate.
8. Check In Judges should copy the final number of voters from the electronic poll book and record the information on the Closing Certificate.
9. The optical scanner will report the number of ballots scanned, the number of partially scanned ballots, and the total number as well as a list of all spoiled ballot serial numbers. The Chief Judge and other Judges verify these numbers with those on the Closing Certificate and mark any discrepancies.
10. Before finalizing the Closing Certificate, an optical scanning tally is produced and printed along with a log of decisions made during the counting process for Instant Runoff Voting as defined in the City Charter and a summary of the number of each ballot ranking. This count, the counting log, and the summary of all ballot-ranking choices (without serial numbers) are posted publicly at the polling site.
11. The seal on the Scanner is broken, and one memory card is removed. The Chief Judge and Scanner Judge will oversee the resealing of the Scanner.
12. The Chief Judge and Scanning Judge stored the memory card in a locked bag, seal it, and take it to the Election Board.
13. Other Judges should report to the Auditorium as assigned, to begin preparing the ballots for scanning or to begin the absentee ballot process.
14. The Chief Judge will report the unofficial results of the count to those assembled in the Council Chambers.

[edit] Absentee Voting

The Election Procedures Ordinance #1989-39 (adopted by the Mayor and Council on October 30, 1989) contains a complete description of the procedure to be followed for absentee voting. Important Election Day steps and information are listed below.

1. Printing: At this time it is unclear if absentee ballots are not printed with the revealing ink (if they are Scantegrity I ballots rather than Scantegrity II ballots), and if they need to be produced and printed separately. The absentee ballots are printed first and the election officials record their serial numbers. The serial numbers of the absentee ballots are different from the serial numbers of the ballots used by voters voting in the polling place.

[edit] General

1. 1. Absentee ballots are issued only to qualified voters who have filled out an acceptable application with the City Clerk. They may be issued during Election Day, but must be returned prior to 8:00 p.m. on Election Day.
   2. Persons who have received an Absentee Ballot cannot vote in person.
   3. To ensure this, the Clerk will have marked ABS in the electronic poll book next to the name of the voter who has been issued an absentee ballot.
   4. The applications, ballots (which are sealed in two envelopes), and a record of the date a ballot is issued and returned are retained by the Clerk until the closing of the polls.
   5. The Chief Judge will assign four judges to open, check, certify the Absentee Ballots. The number of Judges assigned may vary depending upon the Election.
2. Preliminary checks prior to tally
   1. As soon as the polls are closed the Judges assigned to canvass the Absentee Ballots are to assemble at the dais in the Council Chambers.
   2. The Judges are to make checks to determine that the provisions for filling out and signing the oath on the outside of the ballot envelope have been substantially complied with, as well as other checks described in this Section.
   3. Listed below are some specific reasons for rejecting an absentee ballot. The unanimous decision of all the Absentee Judges and the Board of Elections is required to reject a ballot for these or any other reasons:
      1. If more than one ballot is contained in the envelope, all ballots shall be rejected.
      2. More than one ballot received from same person. If this should occur, only the ballot first executed may be counted. If they are undated, or executed on the same date, none are to be counted.
      3. Death of a voter before Election Day. If, prior to counting of the ballots, the Judges of Election as a body have determined by proof or investigation that a person voting absentee has died before Election Day, that person's ballot cannot be counted. If the Judges of Election have not made such a determination, the ballot may not be invalidated, even though it is later made known that the voter was actually dead on Election Day.

1. Challenges of Absentee Ballots: If there are challenges made by Judges or Watchers, they must be made by stating the specific reason. The unopened envelope or the ballot in question should be held aside to await the assembly of all the Judges of Election, since a ballot cannot be rejected except by the unanimous vote of the Judges. (Most of the Judges will not be available for consultation until after completion of the closing procedures and counting of the ballots.)
2. Handling Absentee Voting Materials: No one other than the Judges of Election and authorized City personnel may handle or touch any of the absentee voting material.
3. Canvassing the Ballots -- Detailed Procedure
   1. Checking: opening the ballots. There is an elaborate procedure for the preliminary checking and opening of the ballots; one of the purposes of this procedure is to separate the envelopes from the ballots in such a way that the secrecy of the ballots will be maintained. Each of the three judges involved in this process has specific tasks to perform which are explained in detail below.

[edit] JUDGE #1:

• • • Count the number of ballots delivered by the Clerk; announce and record;
    • Call out the name of the voter;
    • Remove the outer envelope and give it to the Judge #3 for checking against the A.B. Voter List and retention;
    • Compare information on Oath envelope with application;
    • Make sure Oath is complete;
    • Check for signature;
    • If all is OK, pass to Judge #3 for check-off on A.B. Voter List;
    • Pass unopened envelope to Judge #2;
    • When checking is completed, give Register to Judge #3.

[edit] JUDGE #2:

• • • Receive Oath envelope from Judge #1;
    • Open Oath envelope;
    • Remove ballot;
    • Place the ballot in ballot box;
    • Give Oath envelope to Judge #3 for retention;

NOTE: IF MORE THAN ONE BALLOT IN ENVELOPE, NONE MAY BE COUNTED. GIVE TO JUDGE #3 FOR SAFEKEEPING.

JUDGE #3:

• • • As soon as polls are closed, City Clerk will provide the A.B. Voter List
    • Receive outer envelopes from Judge #1;
    • Band all outer envelopes together and place in strong box;
    • Receive Oath envelopes from Judge #2;
    • Band together and place in strong box;
    • All material must be stored in strong box before canvas scan begin;
    • Remember--none of the election materials may be touched by anyone other than Election Judge.

THE PROCEDURES DESCRIBED ABOVE MUST BE REPEATED FOR EACH BALLOT BEFORE GOING ON TO THE NEXT PROCESS --READING AND RECORDING OF THE VOTES.

1. 1. Reading and recording the votes. This process may not begin until the checking has been completed and all the envelopes have been placed in the strong box by Judge #3.
      1. Challenged ballots will be disputed by the Judges and agreed upon and based upon the interpretation will be modified accordingly.
      2. The Judges will scan all the valid absentee ballots with the scanner.
      3. Each ballot will be placed in a ballot box for safekeeping and later hand tallying.

[edit] Counting Procedures

The City has partnered with SVST to perform the recording of all ballots (including absentee, provisional, emergency and audio). SVST will provide the results of ballot scans on the night of the election.

These procedures include previous hand count procedures and the newer Scantegrity Procedures. The ballots cast during the Election Day at the polling place are scanned before casting. Because the scanning is done in the presence of the voter and the scanner provides feedback to the voter as how it interpreted the ballot, including warnings for over votes or under votes (marking too many or too few candidates), as well as marking a ballot in an invalid way (e.g. ranking the same candidate twice), any challenge should be resolved at this time.

[edit] Electronic Tally

Using the ballots scanned during the election, along with the emergency ballots and the audio ballots, Scantegrity will produce a tally in the night of the election, as soon as possible after polls closed. For every tally produced, Scantegrity will provide reports on how the ballots were tallied with details on what happened in each round of tallying. Judges should plan to be present and observe the process to ensure its validity.

The results of the ballot scans are made available on a memory card. Using these ballots, along with the emergency ballots and the audio ballots, Scantegrity will produce a Scanner tally and a Verifiable Scantegrity Tally on the night of the election, as soon as possible after polls closed. The procedures are as follows:

1. The Election Board receives the locked security bag, verifies the seal, and inserts the card into the machine running the Election Manager.
2. The Election Manager will report the number of ballots scanned, the number of partially scanned ballots, and the total number as well as a list of all spoiled ballot serial numbers. The Election Board verifies these numbers.
3. After verification, the Election Board instructs the Election Manager to calculate results. These include the same results produced by the Scanner in addition to the Scantegrity results, and both are posted publicly.
4. Ballot boxes are set in secured storage for counting after absentee ballots have been processed.

[edit] Hand Tally

On the following day after the Absentee and Provisional Ballots have been processed, a hand count will be conducted. Refer to the city charter for specific rules regarding this procedure.

[edit] General Guidelines and Counting Absentee/Provisional Ballots

No one other than the Judges of Election, and members of Scantegrity authorized by the City Clerk, and authorized City personnel may handle or touch any of the voting material.

Rules given to the voter are Ranked Choice Voting / Voter's Mark. Voters have been asked to rank candidates by order of choice (1, 2, 3, and so on) by filling in one oval in the choice column next to a candidate's name. Write-in votes are allowed, and voters have been instructed to rank their write-in candidate as well. Voters are free to rank only one candidate or as many candidates as they wish.

For ballots that are not scanned in the presence of the voter that cast it (e.g. absentee ballots), as a general rule, if the voter circled the number instead of filling it in, or if the voter wrote their rankings next to the candidates' names, or in some other way CLEARLY indicated their choices, those ballots shall be considered valid. Rejection of a ballot that was not scanned in the presence of the voter that cast it can only occur by the UNANIMOUS VOTE OF THE BOARD OF ELECTIONS.

[edit] =Tally Verification

This is the tally verification mechanism provided by Scantegrity.

1. After results are posted, Auditors are given 3 days to post their Tally Challenges.
2. The Election Board uses the Election Manager to respond to the challenges and posts the result of the audit.
3. Auditors (and any interested party) can verify that the response to the tally challenges is valid and correct or not.

[edit] Proclamation of Results

Preliminary results shall be reported on the unofficial returns board. Once the judges have determined apparent winners after the count is complete, the Chief Judge shall announce the results of the votes cast to the persons assembled in the Auditorium and announce the apparent winners.

The checks and balances shall be completed before certification of the results to the City Council.

The results will not be certified to the City Council until the Wednesday following the election in the Auditorium, 7500 Maple Avenue, Takoma Park, Maryland.

[edit] Forms

The following is a list of forms that we believe need to be created for the Election:

1. Checklists
   1. Check-In Judge 1 and 2
   2. Ballot Judge
   3. Ward Judge
   4. Scanning Judge
   5. Voter Accessibility
   6. Ballot Spoil
   7. Ballot Audit
2. Incident Log
3. Affidavit of Voter
4. Voter Assistance Record
5. Provisional Voter Explanation
6. Affidavit of Ballot Audit or Spoil
7. Get More Ballots
8. Unofficial Turnout Report
9. Watcher's Certificate
10. Closing Certificate
11. Ballot Security Certificate

[edit] Posters

The following is a list of Posters that we believe need to be created and where they should be posted for the Election:

1. Voting Rules (no talking, no cell phones, no children over 12, etc)
2. Voting Instructions (in booths?)
3. Accessibility Options Notice
4. Provisional Voting Notice
5. Spoiling/Audit Notice
6. Directional Arrows (Possibly numbered based on step?)
7. Ward Number Posters

[edit] Research Procedures

Our overall goal is to develop a robust cost-effective voting system that is practical, easy to use and administer, accessible, transparent, reliable, verifiable, trusted and accepted widely, and has a high-integrity audit trail. E2E technology is the most promising technology for improving election results assurance, and Scantegrity is the most viable voting system for making E2E technology a practical reality in the immediate future.

The test of Scantegrity in a binding government election is needed to determine how well it works from the perspectives of voters and election officials. Through observations, questionnaires, expert review, and focus groups, we will measure how easy Scantegrity is to use by voters and how well voters accept and trust it. Similarly, we will measure the impact of Scantegrity on election officials and procedures and how well election officials accept it. Because they are not artificial creations, binding elections offer the most accurate and demanding context in which to measure the impact of voting technology on election officials and procedures and how well voters accept the technology.

Both the mock election and the binding election will include ballot casting steps and optional vote verification steps. The vote verification steps permit each voter to verify that his or her vote was correctly recorded into the official data, and these steps also permit anyone to verify that the tallies are correctly computed from the official data. We shall call our first mock election Mock 1; it will take place on April 11, 2009. A second mock election, called Mock 2 (not addressed in this document), will take place in April 2010; it will be followed by an expert review on the same day.

Mock1 is a capabilities demonstration. It is necessary to demonstrate the team's readiness to proceed with the binding election, and our signed agreement with the City of Takoma Park requires such a demonstration. Given this requirement, Mock1 must follow essentially the same procedures as for the binding election.

[edit] The Mock 1 Election

Specific Aim 1: To demonstrate our readiness to proceed to use Scantegrity in a binding election, by validating procedures modified to support the auditing system and by measuring the usability of the new system through a mock election.===

Working with the City of Takoma Park, we will organize and conduct a mock election to be held on Takoma Park's celebration of Arbor Day, Saturday, April 11, 2009. The City will solicit volunteer voters and provide election judges and space to conduct this Mock1 election in their Community Center. The desired number of voters is at least 100 and preferably 300. Each voter will be given the opportunity to carry out two steps: voting and vote verification. Polls will be open from 9am to 3pm.

The City will solicit volunteer voters through direct mail, ads (City web site, City Newsletter distributed to every family), and by contacting neighborhood associations, local colleges (Montgomery College, Columbia Union College), and City employees (100 work in the Community Center, and another 50 work in the nearby public works building). Arbor Day is a popular festival attracting hundreds of people. We will try to arrange for the first 300 voters to receive a choice tree from the many given away that day. It is likely that we will attract at least 300 voters.

Mock1 will closely follow the procedures for the binding election, except each voter will be given a 'cue sheet,' permitting us to measure accuracy of intent capture. Only one system will be used, and no errors will be introduced intentionally. The one-sheet ballot will contain a number of races, including for mayor and city council seats. Each voter will receive simple instructions, circle his or her intended selections on the cue sheet, mark a Scantegrity ballot (with the goal of marking the same choices as on the cue sheet), cast the Scantegrity ballot, and fill out a questionnaire. For each voter, we will record the serial number of the ballot on the cue sheet and questionnaire, so that we can associate the ballot, cue sheet, and corresponding answers to questionnaires (while preserving voter anonymity). Similar to Herrnson's, the questionnaire will ask about the voting process and collect demographic information.

Voters will be encouraged to participate in a separate on-line Scantegrity post-voting verification step, to be available from any computer connected to the Internet, beginning very soon after the polls close. In this step, voters will check that their votes were correctly recorded in the official data. An on-line dispute resolution process will be available for voters who assert that the official data did not include their codenumber. Although the verification site will be available for at least one year, there will be a closing date for official protests. After verifying his or her ballot, each voter will be encouraged to fill out a second questionnaire'this one on-line'about the verification process. It will be useful to learn how many voters attempt to verify their votes, without creating unrealistic procedures or incentives for them to do so.

The election will be conducted by City poll workers, trained using training manuals developed by us (to be written under this project). Thus, we will neither conduct the election, nor directly train the poll workers. This process offers the best chance to measure the impact of Scantegrity on election officials. Following the election, each poll worker will be given a questionnaire asking about problems that occurred and collecting demographic information. Part of the poll worker agreement is to fill out the questionnaire and participate in the focus group. At the end of the day, four tallies will be computed and reconciled: the official Scantegrity tally, the electronic optical scan tally without Scantegrity's audit log, the hand-counted ballots, and the cue sheets.

Through direct measurements and questionnaires, we will collect the following metrics: time to vote, time to verify, cost per vote, number of ballots spoiled, number of times voter asked for assistance during voting, number of times voter asked for assistance during verification, number of incidents requiring intervention by a poll worker, whether the voter completed casting a ballot, whether the voter completed the verification procedure. Six voters and all poll workers will be invited to participate in focus group discussions held later that day.

The primary election server (for the verification step) will be located in the City's computer room. This site will be mirrored at UMBC and GWU by servers in secure computing rooms. Each server will be protected by SSL authentication and will monitor the other two.

As outlined in out agreement with the City, we and the City will consider the mock election a success if each of the following conditions is satisfied: (1) Fewer than 2% percent of voters spoil ballots because of not knowing how to operate the equipment. (2) Time to vote is reasonable: up to 2 minutes (depending on ballot size). (3) The initial results are obtained within two hours after the Mock Election. (4) Each voter is able to check his or her vote using the web interface. (5) Poll workers are able carry out the prescribed procedures. After the mock election, in consultation with the Advisory Committee, we will solicit feedback on desired changes to the system, if any. These changes are limited to feature requests, must be requested within one month after completion of the mock election, and will not include new components to the system. Feature requests are typically user interface modifications, cosmetic changes to software look or feel, options to make certain software functions easier, or changes to documentation.

The City requires use of Instant Runoff Voting (IRV), which requires voters to rank order all candidates. Scantegrity can easily accommodate this requirement: for each candidate, the voter 'votes' on the rank of that candidate. The scanner will notify voters who mark their ballots inconsistently.

In prior elections, voters who could not mark or could not see were given human assistance in casting their ballots. For 2009, as per our agreement with the City, voters with visual or motor skill impairments should be allowed to cast ballots independently. Thus, we will provide an accessible interface for Scantegrity. To this end, a traditional automatic ballot marking device with audio feedback will be sufficient for the binding election, even though such a device would likely not provide the same level of integrity and privacy for sighted and blind voters.

Efforts to improve accessibility for voters with visual and motor disabilities are ongoing. Vora, Chaum, Sherman, and one of Sherman's students have been exploring more secure and private strategies for an accessible interface to Scantegrity for the blind. For this project, we prefer solutions for which each disabled voter is given a ballot from the same stack of ballots given to other voters, and for which the voter does not bring any personal computing device into the polling place. One possible solution would use two machines: one to emboss the ballot sections; the other to ink the ovals and speak the revealed codenumbers, without learning the ballot values. Following this ballot marking, process the voter could then choose whether to audit the marked ballot or cast it by scanning it with the main scanner. The voter would take home an audio recording of the spoken codenumbers made by a recording device attached to the earphones. Another possible solution is to adapt an approach from Punchscan in which the voter simultaneously hears separate left- and right-channel audio signals, with the voter taking home an audio recording of one of these signals.

We will deploy at least two scanners in Mock1, supported by an uninterrupted battery backup power supplies. If all scanners fail, then we will still collect the paper ballots, and scan them at the first available opportunity. These procedures provide a high level of assured operations.

If problems are found that would affect the ability of the City to conduct the election, the City may re-evaluate and set requirements for meeting acceptable standards within one month after Mock1. We will undertake our best efforts to comply reasonably with these requirements by July 31, 2009.

In January 2009, we will submit a proposal to conduct research with human subjects to the UMBC Institutional Review Board, which we will submit in January 2009. We do not expect any difficulty with our applications because they not controversial. Furthermore, institutional approval does not affect the City's ability to conduct the mock and binding elections with Scantegrity.

1. Scantegrity Voting System Website. http://www.scantegrity.org/, last accessed on January 31^st, 2009.
2. City of Takoma Park Website. http://takomaparkmd.gov/, last accessed on February 12^th, 2009.
3. Takoma Park Code and Charter. http://www.takomaparkmd.gov/code/index.html, last accessed on September 13, 2008.
4. Ballot and polling place design guidelines. http://www.aiga.org/content.cfm/design-for-democracy-eac-reports, last accessed on September 24, 2008.
5. Takoma Park Election Judge Manual. October 26^th, 2007. Obtained by request from the Office of the City Clerk of Takoma Park.